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1Error in Nash existence proof
Noah D. Stein∗
September 27, 2018
The goal of this note is to explain a problem with the proof of Nash’s theorem in [5],
which is the main document attached below. We will use the notation of that paper through-
out without further comment, with the exception that each document has its own section
numbers and list of references. We are indebted to Sergiu Hart and Eran Shmaya for their
careful study of [5] which led to their simultaneous discovery of this error. So far the error
has not been fixed, but many of the results and techniques of the paper remain valid, so we
will continue to make it available online.
1 The problem
The error is in our proof of Lemma 4.6, which is the main driver behind our assertion that
order m exchangeable equilibria exist (Theorem 4.7). Of course they do exist; this is the main
benefit of setting out to prove something you already know to be true. To our knowledge
everything before and after this step remains unaffected, but this is an important step in the
middle of the proof and logically it must be patched if we are to reach the desired conclusion.
The particular problem is our implicit use of the “fact” below. In the incorrect proof of
Lemma 4.6 of [5], this “fact” was applied with ΞmΓ in place of Γ and appropriate choices of
σ ∈ ∆ΠG×Sm(ΞmΓ) and τ ∈ ∆ΠG×Sm(ΠmΓ).
“Fact” 1. Let σ, τ ∈ ∆Π(Γ) be two strategy profiles such that σi is payoff equivalent to τi in
Γ for all i. Then σ and τ are payoff equivalent when viewed as strategies for the maximizer
in the associated zero-sum game Γ0.
This may sound reasonable at first because it seems that the difference between payoff-
equivalent strategies should not be game-theoretically significant. In fact it is false! And not
just for odd counterexamples: it is false generically.
Example 2. To see how this can fail, let Γ be the following symmetric bimatrix game:
A = BT =
1 1 11 1 1
0 0 2
 .
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Let player i’s strategy set be Ci = {ai, bi, ci}. The first two columns of A are equal, as are
the first two rows, so a1 is payoff equivalent to b1. Symmetrically, a2 is payoff equivalent to
b2. In the associated zero-sum game Γ
0 we have
u0M((a1, a2), (a1, c1)) = 1 6= 0 = u0M((b1, b2), (a1, c1)),
so (a1, a2) and (b1, b2) are not payoff equivalent in Γ
0.
Why does this happen? The reason is that when we consider correlated strategies, we are
interested not only in what utility our recommendations give us, but also in what information
they give. While we may not care from a payoff perspective whether strategy ai or bi has
been suggested, the two possibilities may allow us to make completely different inferences
about the behavior of our opponents. It is this information which may be payoff-relevant.
To see this in action, consider the following two distributions over outcomes of Γ:
W 1 =
1
4
1 0 10 0 0
1 0 1
 and W 2 = 1
4
1 0 00 0 1
0 1 1
 .
One can verify that W 1 is a correlated equilibrium, and W 2 is obtained from W 1 by mov-
ing some mass from (a1, c2) and (c1, a2) to (b1, c2) and (c1, b2), which are profiles of payoff
equivalent strategies. Nonetheless, W 2 is not a correlated equilibrium. If player 1 receives
the recommendation b1 then he knows with probability one that player 2 has received the
recommendation c2, hence it is in the interest of player 1 to deviate to c1.
2 A digression on continuous games
In this section we highlight the complications discussed in Section 1 by looking at how
they manifest themselves in the geometry of Nash and correlated equilibria of continuous
games1. Existence of both types of equilibria in continuous games is generally proven in four
steps: 1) discretize the strategy spaces to obtain a finite game, 2) prove the corresponding
existence theorem for finite games, 3) observe that an exact equilibrium of the finite game
is an approximate equilibrium of the continuous game, and 4) show that a limit of such
approximate equilibria is an exact equilibrium of the continuous game.
Steps 1 and 3 are more or less content-free. Step 2 can be accomplished for Nash equilibria
by fixed-point methods or for correlated equilibria by Hart and Schmeidler’s clever minimax
argument. There is an interesting divergence at step 4: in the case of Nash equilibria it is
trivial and in the case of correlated equilibria it seems to require a hairy measure-theoretic
argument (see [1] or [6]).
The difference is easiest to understand in terms of an auxiliary map  : ∆(Γ) → R≥0.
This is defined by the condition that (µ) is the smallest  such that µ is an -correlated
equilibrium (no measurable deviation yields an expected gain of more than ). Let Π be
1For concreteness’ sake, define these to be games with finitely many players, compact metric strategy
spaces, and continuous utility functions.
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the restriction of  to ∆Π(Γ). Then Π(µ) is also the smallest  such that µ is an -Nash
equilibrium in the usual sense.
We can study the map  via two different topologies on its domain ∆(Γ): the weak and
strong topologies. Two measures are near each other in the strong topology if you can get
from one to the other without moving much mass. They are near each other in the weak
topology if you can get from one to the other without moving much mass very far.
It is easy to show that  is continuous with respect to the strong topology, but this is not
very useful because ∆(Γ) is not compact with respect to this topology (at least when Γ is
not a finite game) so the limiting arguments do not go through. It is compact with respect
to the weak topology and viewing ∆Π(Γ) as a space of tuples it is easy to show that Π is
continuous with respect to the weak topology, hence we get the necessary limiting argument
for the existence of Nash equilibria.
For correlated equilibria the situation is different:  is not weakly continuous! The
argument is essentially the same as why W 1 was a correlated equilibrium in Example 2 but
W 2 was not. We can move some mass a little bit (thinking now of strategically equivalent
strategies as being quite “close” to each other) and change the information conveyed by the
correlating device drastically. This changes an exact correlated equilibrium to a distribution
for which  is bounded away from zero, no matter how small the distance we moved the
mass.
In particular this shows that  is not weakly upper semicontinuous. In fact this doesn’t
matter; all we really need for the existence proof is weak lower semicontinuity. It turns out
 has this property, but proving it is a delicate technical matter (again, see [1] or [6]).
The fact that Nash equilibria behave nicely with respect to strategic equivalence is what
allows us to turn problems regarding mixed Nash equilibria of polynomial games into finite-
dimensional problems in moment spaces: see for example [2] and [3]. The failure of correlated
equilibria to behave nicely with respect to strategic equivalence is captured by the fact that
the corresponding problems for correlated equilibria are inherently infinite-dimensional [4].
3 A more specific problem
The erroneous proof of Lemma 4.6 claims to construct, for any symmetric mixed strategy y
of the minimizer in the game (ΞmΓ)0, a mixed strategy piy ∈ ∆G×Sm(ΠmΓ) for the maximizer
such that u0M(pi
y, y) = 0. Furthermore, the construction implicitly claims that such a piy can
be found which does not depend on the utilities of Γ (as is the case in [1]) and which is
rational in y. That is to say, the elements of piy are in the field generated by the elements of
y over Q. For simplicity we will write piy ∈ Q[y].
Let us see how rationality of piy follows from the proof of Lemma 4.6. First note that a
finite zero-sum game has a maximin strategy which is rational in the utilities, because the
set of maximin strategies is a polytope defined by inequalities with coefficients linear in the
utilities. Therefore Lemmas 2.15 and 3.8 show that the certificates piy constructed in Hart
and Schmeidler’s proof of the existence of correlated equilibria and our proof of the existence
of exchangeable equilibria are in Q[y]. But Lemma 4.6 claims to construct the certificate
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piy for order m exchangeable equilibria by taking the one from Lemma 3.8 for exchangeable
equilibria and replacing it by the product of its marginals. That is to say, we are taking the
image of a tuple of elements of Q[y] under a polynomial map, and so we end up with another
tuple piy ∈ Q[y].
Example 3. In fact such a piy need not exist for order m exchangeable equilibria, as the
following example due to Sergiu Hart shows. Consider the symmetric bimatrix game Γ and
its contracted second power Ξ2Γ shown in Table 1. Suppose the minimizer plays the mixed
strategy yα,β which assigns probability α to 00 → 01 and 00 → 10 and probability β to
11→ 01 and 11→ 10 for each player, so we have 4(α + β) = 1.
To have piyα,β ∈ ∆Z2×S2(Π2Γ) means that piyα,β is a product of four i.i.d. Bernoulli(p)
random variables for some p ∈ [0, 1]. For notational simplicity we will let q = 1 − p. Then
we can compute the expected utility of the maximizer in (Ξ2Γ)0 as:
u0M(pi
yα,β , yα,β) = 4(αq
2 − βp2)(qr + ps).
For this expression to be zero for all r and s we must have αq2 = βp2, so
p =
√
α√
α +
√
β
and q =
√
β√
α +
√
β
,
and these expressions are clearly not rational in α and β. But p and q are marginals of piyα,β
and so can be written as sums of its elements. Thus the entries of piyα,β cannot all be rational
in α and β either.
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A new proof of Nash’s Theorem via
exchangeable equilibria
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, and Asuman Ozdaglar∗
September 27, 2018
Abstract
We give a novel proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in all finite games without
using fixed point theorems or path following arguments. Our approach relies on a
new notion intermediate between Nash and correlated equilibria called exchangeable
equilibria, which are correlated equilibria with certain symmetry and factorization
properties. We prove these exist by a duality argument, using Hart and Schmeidler’s
proof of correlated equilibrium existence as a first step.
In an appropriate limit exchangeable equilibria converge to the convex hull of Nash
equilibria, proving that these exist as well. Exchangeable equilibria are defined in
terms of symmetries of the game, so this method automatically proves the stronger
statement that a symmetric game has a symmetric Nash equilibrium. The case without
symmetries follows by a symmetrization argument.
1 Introduction
Nash’s Theorem is one of the most fundamental results in game theory and states that
any finite game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. Despite its importance, the
authors of the present paper know of only three essentially different proofs. The first and
most common way to prove Nash’s Theorem is by applying a fixed point theorem, usually
Brouwer’s or Kakutani’s, to a map whose fixed points are easily shown to be Nash equilibria.
The fixed point theorem is usually proven combinatorially, say by Sperner’s Lemma [15] or
Gale’s argument using the game of hex [5], or with (co-)homology theory, a suite of powerful
but less elementary tools from algebraic topology [8].
The second proof of Nash’s Theorem (historically) is algorithmic and consists of showing
that the Lemke-Howson path-following algorithm terminates at a Nash equilibrium [11]. In
fact this is not so different from the fixed point proof, because Sperner’s Lemma is also
proven by a path-following argument.
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The third proof of Nash’s theorem is due to Kohlberg and Mertens and is topological
[10]. The idea is to simultaneously consider the set of all games of a given size and the set of
all (game, equilibrium) pairs. Under appropriate compactifications both of these sets become
spheres of the same dimension. One then shows that the mapping sending an equilibrium to
the corresponding game is homotopic to the identity map on the sphere. A (co-)homological
or degree-theoretic argument shows that such a map must be onto [8]. Technically speaking
this step is almost identical to the proof of Brouwer’s Fixed Point Theorem, so the third
proof is closely related to the first.
All three proofs have provided unique insights into the structure of Nash equilibria and it
is our hope that a different proof, which uses neither fixed point theorems, nor path-following
arguments, nor any algebro-topological tools, will provide further insights.
Hart and Schmeidler [7] have proven the weaker result that correlated equilibria exist by a
clever application of the Minimax Theorem, summarized in Section 2.2. For games endowed
with a group action, a simple averaging argument then proves that a symmetric correlated
equilibrium exists (Proposition 2.26). We show that for such games Hart and Schmeidler’s
proof can be strengthened to produce correlated equilibria with additional symmetry and
factorization properties, which we call exchangeable equilibria (Theorem 3.9).
To illustrate this idea, consider the case of k × k symmetric bimatrix games (two-player
games fixed under the operation of swapping the players). Let X = {xxT | x ∈ Rk×1≥0 }. Then
we have
Nash
CE ∩X ⊆
convex hull of Nash
conv(CE ∩X) ⊆
exchangeable
CE ∩ conv(X) ⊆
correlated
CE ,
where each type of (symmetric) equilibrium is defined by the set written below it. This
definition shows that the exchangeable equilibria are a natural mathematical object. For
examples and game-theoretic interpretations of exchangeable equilibria, see the companion
paper [16].
In Section 3 we extend the definition of exchangeable equilibria games to n-player games
with arbitrary symmetry groups. The preceding discussion shows that the set of exchange-
able equilibria is convex, compact, contained in the set of symmetric correlated equilibria,
and contains the convex hull of the set of symmetric Nash equilibria. One can show that
these containments can all be strict [16], so proving existence of exchangeable equilibria is a
step in the right direction, but does not immediately prove existence of Nash equilibria.
However, we can use the same techniques to prove existence of exchangeable equilibria
with successively stronger symmetry properties as follows. For a fixed n-player game Γ and
number m ∈ N, we define two new games ΠmΓ and ΞmΓ, which we call mth powers of Γ.
These are larger games in which m copies of Γ are played simultaneously. The difference
between the two powers is that ΠmΓ has a different group of players for each copy, so mn
players total, whereas ΞmΓ has just one group of n players playing all m copies, but perhaps
choosing different actions in each copy (Figure 1).
There is a natural marginalization map sending exchangeable equilibria of either of these
powers to exchangeable equilibria of Γ. In fact, any exchangeable equilibrium of Γ can be
lifted to an exchangeable equilibrium of either power, and for a symmetric Nash equilibrium
we can take these two lifts to be the same. However, for a general exchangeable equilibrium
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the two lifts need not be compatible, so it is natural to consider the intersection XEm(Γ) :=
XE(ΠmΓ)∩XE(ΞmΓ) of the sets of exchangeable equilibria of the two powers. We call these
order m exchangeable equilibria of Γ and prove they exist using a similar Minimax argument
(Theorem 4.7).
Under appropriate identifications these sets turn out to be nested as m grows and, being
convex, they all contain the convex hull of the symmetric Nash equilibria:
NE(Γ) ⊆ conv(NE(Γ)) ⊆ . . . ⊆ XE3(Γ) ⊆ XE2(Γ) ⊆ XE1(Γ) = XE(Γ) ⊆ CE(Γ).
Assuming Γ has a rich enough symmetry group (e.g. if it is a symmetric bimatrix game or,
more generally, if it satisfies a condition we call player transitivity), then as m goes to infinity
these converge to symmetric correlated equilibria in which the outcome of the correlating
device is common knowledge; such correlated equilibria are known to be mixtures of sym-
metric Nash equilibria (Theorems 4.9 and 5.1). In particular, this proves that symmetric
Nash equilibria exist in games with rich enough symmetry groups.
Note that symmetry is fundamental in this argument. For example, if we had begun with
a general bimatrix game and let X = {xyT | x, y ∈ Rk×1≥0 } we would have had conv(X) =
Rk×k≥0 , so the exchangeable equilibria (even the order m exchangeable equilibria) would have
been exactly the correlated equilibria and we would not have strengthened the equilibrium
notion at all. However, there are several ways of turning general games into symmetric games
[6] and applying such a procedure proves existence of Nash equilibria in all games (Section
5.2).
Up to the step of taking m to infinity, all the steps of our proof are computationally effec-
tive. Papadimitriou has shown how to apply the ellipsoid algorithm to Hart and Schmeidler’s
proof to efficiently compute a correlated equilibrium of a large game [13]. The same tech-
nique applied to our proof allows one to compute an exchangeable equilibrium (or an order
m exchangeable equilibrium for fixed m) in polynomial time, even though the set of these
is not polyhedral. Computing these is interesting in its own right [16] and may be useful
for computing approximate Nash equilibria. However, computation is not the focus of this
paper and we leave a detailed investigation of these ideas for future work.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. We begin with background material
in Section 2. We cover the definitions of games and equilibria, give an overview of Hart
and Schmeidler’s proof of the existence of correlated equilibria so we can modify it later,
and introduce group actions. In Section 3 we introduce exchangeable equilibria and prove
existence of these for games under arbitrary group actions. We do the same for order m ex-
changeable equilibria in Section 4, introducing powers of games along the way. We complete
the argument in Section 5 by showing that the order m exchangeable equilibria converge to
mixtures of symmetric Nash equilibria in games with a player transitive symmetry group,
and then showing that we can symmetrize any game to make this condition hold. Section 6
concludes and gives directions for future work.
3
2 Background
This section is divided into three parts. In the first part we lay out the basic definitions of
finite games as well as Nash and correlated equilibria to fix notation. We assume the reader
is familiar with these concepts and do not attempt to motivate them. The second part
reviews Hart and Schmeidler’s proof of the existence of correlated equilibria [7], preparing
for similar arguments in this paper. The third part covers symmetries of games.
The concept of a symmetry of a game extends back at least to Nash’s paper [12]. Sym-
metries are fundamental to the present paper, so we spend more time on these and give
some examples. Although we use the language of group theory to discuss symmetries, it is
worth noting that we do not use any but the most basic theorems from group theory (e.g.,
the fact that for any h in a group G, the maps g 7→ gh and g 7→ hg are bijections from G
to G). Everything in this section is standard except for the notions of a good reply, a good
set, a player-trivial symmetry group, a player-transitive symmetry group, and the remarks
following the statement of Nash’s Theorem.
2.1 Games and equilibria
Definition 2.1. A (finite) game has a finite set I of n ≥ 2 players, each with a finite set Ci
of at least two strategies (also called pure strategies) and a utility function ui : C → R,
where C =
∏
Ci. A game is zero-sum if it has two players, called the maximizer (denoted
M) and the minimizer (denoted m), and satisfies uM + um ≡ 0.
For elements of Ci we use Roman letters subscripted with the player’s identity, such as
si and ti. We will typically use the unsubscripted letter s to denote a strategy profile (a
choice of strategy for each player). For a choice of a strategy for all players except i we use
the symbol s−i. To denote the set of Borel probability distributions on a space X we write
∆(X). For much of the paper X will be finite so we can view ∆(X) as a simplex in the
finite-dimensional vector space RX of real-valued functions on X. For x ∈ X the probability
distribution which assigns unit mass to x will be written δx ∈ ∆(X).
Definition 2.2. A mixed strategy for player i in a game Γ is a probability distribution
over his pure strategy set Ci, and the set of mixed strategies for player i is ∆(Ci). The set
of mixed strategy profiles (also called independent or product distributions) will be
denoted ∆Π(Γ) :=
∏
i ∆(Ci).
For independent distributions it is important that we write ∆Π(Γ) rather than ∆Π(C),
because Γ specifies how C is to be thought of as a product. For example, the set S × S × S
could be viewed as a product of three copies of S, or a product of S with S × S, and these
lead to different notions of an independent distribution – one is a product of three terms
and one is a product of two terms. This distinction will be particularly important when we
define powers of games in Section 4.
To make the notation fit together we will write ∆(Γ) for ∆(C). We may then view ∆Π(Γ)
as the (nonconvex) subset of ∆(Γ) consisting of product distributions or as a convex subset
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of RunionsqiCi . The former view will be natural when we define exchangeable equilibria, which
live in ∆(Γ), as convex combinations of product distributions. The latter will be useful
when looking for product distributions which are fixed by a group action (see the proof of
Lemma 3.8); such fixed distributions are easy to find with a convex setup (Proposition 2.18).
Which of these views we are using will be clear from context if not explicitly specified.
As usual we extend the domain of ui from C to ∆(Γ) by linearity, defining ui(pi) =∑
s∈C ui(s)pi(s). Having done so we can define equilibria.
Definition 2.3. A Nash equilibrium is an n-tuple (ρ1, . . . , ρn) ∈ ∆Π(Γ) =
∏
i ∆(Ci) of
mixed strategies, one for each player, such that ui(si, ρ−i) ≤ ui(ρi, ρ−i) for all strategies
si ∈ Ci and all players i. The set of Nash equilibria of a game Γ is denoted NE(Γ).
Definition 2.4. A correlated equilibrium is a joint distribution pi ∈ ∆(Γ) such that∑
s−i∈C−i [ui(ti, s−i)− ui(s)]pi(s) ≤ 0 for all strategies si, ti ∈ Ci and all players i. The set
of correlated equilibria of a game Γ is denoted CE(Γ).
The following alternative characterization of correlated equilibria is standard and we omit
its proof. Suppose (X1, . . . , Xn) is a random vector taking values in C. We think of Xi as
a (random) strategy recommended to player i. Given this information, player i can form
his conditional beliefs P(X−i | Xi) about the recommendations to the other players given
his own recommendation. That is to say, P(X−i | Xi) is a random variable taking values in
∆(C−i) which is a function of Xi. One can then define the event
{the pure strategy Xi is a best response to the distribution P(X−i | Xi) for all i}.
The distribution of (X1, . . . , Xn) is a correlated equilibrium if and only if this event happens
almost surely. More succinctly:
Proposition 2.5. Let (X1, . . . , Xn) be a random vector taking values in C distributed ac-
cording to pi ∈ ∆(Γ). Then pi is a correlated equilibrium if and only if Xi is a best response
to P(X−i | Xi) almost surely for all i.
Nash equilibria correspond exactly to the correlated equilibria which are product distri-
butions, so viewing ∆Π(Γ) as a subset of ∆(Γ) we can write NE(Γ) = CE(Γ) ∩∆Π(Γ). We
introduce the existence theorems for correlated and Nash equilibria in Sections 2.2 and 2.3.
We need the Minimax Theorem at this point to define the value of a zero-sum game. It
also plays an important role in our proof of Nash’s Theorem. An elementary proof can be
given using the separating hyperplane theorem [2].
Minimax Theorem. Let U and V be finite-dimensional vector spaces with compact convex
subsets K ⊂ U and L ⊂ V . Let Φ : U × V → R be a bilinear map. Then
sup
x∈K
inf
y∈L
Φ(x, y) = inf
y∈L
sup
x∈K
Φ(x, y),
and the optima are attained.
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Definition 2.6. Given a zero-sum game Γ, we can apply this theorem with K = ∆(CM),
L = ∆(Cm), and Φ = uM . The common value of these two optimization problems is called
the value of the game and denoted v(Γ). Maximizers on the left hand side are called
maximin strategies and the set of such is denoted Mm(Γ) ⊆ ∆(CM).
We now introduce the notion of a good reply in a zero-sum game. This is not a standard
definition, but it will simplify the statements of several arguments below. The name is meant
to be evocative of the term best reply : while a best reply is one which maximizes one’s payoff,
a good reply is merely one which returns a “good” payoff: at least the value of the game1.
Definition 2.7. In a zero-sum game Γ, we say that a strategy σ ∈ ∆(CM) for the maximizer
is a good reply to θ ∈ ∆(Cm) if uM(σ, θ) ≥ v(Γ). We say that a set Σ ⊆ ∆(CM) of strategies
is good against the set Θ ⊆ ∆(Cm) if for all θ ∈ Θ there is a σ ∈ Σ which is a good reply
to θ. If Σ is good against ∆(Cm) we say that Σ is good.
The main result about good sets is:
Proposition 2.8. If Γ is a zero-sum game and Σ ⊆ ∆(CM) is good, then Γ has a maximin
strategy in conv(Σ), i.e., conv(Σ) ∩Mm(Γ) 6= ∅.
Proof. Apply the Minimax Theorem with K = conv(Σ) and L = ∆(Cm).
It is worth noting that in general a good set need not include a maximin strategy. For
example, in any zero-sum game the set CM ( ∆(CM) is a good set, but some zero-sum
games such as matching pennies only have mixed maximin strategies, i.e. CM ∩Mm(Γ) = ∅.
The notion of payoff equivalence is a standard way to turn structural information about
a game into structural information about equilibria. The proofs of both propositions below
are immediate.
Definition 2.9. Two mixed strategies σi, τi ∈ ∆(Ci) are said to be payoff equivalent if
uj(σi, s−i) = uj(τi, s−i) for all s−i ∈ C−i and all players j.
Proposition 2.10. If Γ is a zero-sum game, Σ is good, and each σ ∈ Σ is payoff equivalent
to some σ′ ∈ Σ′, then Σ′ is good.
Proposition 2.11. If σi is payoff equivalent to τi for all i, then (σ1, . . . , σn) is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if (τ1, . . . , τn) is a Nash equilibrium.
2.2 Hart and Schmeidler’s proof
In this section we recall the structure of Hart and Schmeidler’s proof of the existence of
correlated equilibria based on the Minimax Theorem [7]. The goal of this is to frame their
argument in a way which will allow us to extend it, redoing as little as possible of the work
they have done. We will use similar arguments to prove Theorems 3.9 and 4.7.
1Good sets are similar in spirit to Voorneveld’s prep sets [18], but tailored to zero-sum games.
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Hart and Schmeidler’s argument begins by associating with a game Γ a new zero-sum
game Γ0 and interpreting correlated equilibria of Γ as maximin strategies of this new game. In
Γ0 the maximizer plays the roles of all the players in Γ simultaneously and the minimizer tries
to find a profitable unilateral deviation from the strategy profile selected by the maximizer.
Definition 2.12. Given any game Γ, define a two-player zero-sum game Γ0 with C0M := C,
C0m :=
⊔
iCi × Ci, and utilities
u0M(s, (ri, ti)) = −u0m(s, (ri, ti)) :=
{
ui(s)− ui(ti, s−i) if ri = si,
0 otherwise.
Proposition 2.13. Let Γ be any game. For any player i in Γ, ri ∈ Ci, and s ∈ C we
have u0M(s, (ri, ri)) = 0, so we can bound the value of Γ
0 by v(Γ0) ≤ 0. A mixed strategy
σ ∈ ∆(C0M) = ∆(C) for the maximizer in Γ0 satisfies u0M(σ, (ri, ti)) ≥ 0 for all (ri, ti) ∈ C0m
if and only if σ ∈ CE(Γ). Therefore, if v(Γ0) = 0 then Mm(Γ0) = CE(Γ).
Proof. Immediate from the definitions.
To prove v(Γ0) = 0, and hence the existence of correlated equilibria (Theorem 2.16),
we must show that for any y ∈ ∆(C0m) there is a pi ∈ ∆(C0M) such that uM(pi, y) ≥ 0.
Hart and Schmeidler actually show that there exists such a pi with some extra structure,
which we summarize in Lemma 2.15. We will exploit this extra structure below to prove
stronger statements in a similar spirit: Lemmas 3.8 and 4.6. These in turn allow us to prove
the existence of exchangeable equilibria (Theorem 3.9) and order m exchangeable equilibria
(Theorem 4.7).
Given a y = (y1, . . . , yn) ∈ ∆(C0m), yi ∈ RCi×Ci , a good reply pi can be constructed in
terms of certain auxiliary games γ(yi). For the purposes of the present paper, it is more
important to understand the statement of Lemma 2.15 than to remember the details of this
construction. Besides this lemma the only property of γ(yi) we will need is that its definition
is independent of how elements of Ci are labeled (Proposition 3.7).
Definition 2.14. For any player i in Γ and any nonnegative yi ∈ RCi×Ci , define the zero-sum
game γ(yi) with strategy sets CM = Cm := Ci and utilities
uM(si, ti) = −um(si, ti) :=
{∑
ri 6=ti y
si,ri
i if si = ti,
−ysi,tii otherwise.
Lemma 2.15 ([7]). Fix a game Γ and consider Γ0. If y ∈ ∆(C0m), then any strategy
pi ∈ Mm(γ(y1))×· · ·×Mm(γ(yn)) ⊂ ∆(C0M) satisfies uM(pi, y) = 0. In particular v(Γ0) = 0,
pi is good against y, and ∆Π(Γ) is good.
Proof. Omitted. See [7] for a proof using the Minimax Theorem.
Theorem 2.16 ([7]). For any game Γ, the value v(Γ0) = 0, so Mm(Γ0) = CE(Γ) and a
correlated equilibrium of Γ exists.
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Proof. Combining Lemma 2.15 and Proposition 2.13, we get Mm(Γ0) = CE(Γ). For exis-
tence, apply Proposition 2.8 to Γ0 with Σ = ∆Π(Γ).
This proof merits two remarks. First of all, since conv(∆Π(Γ)) = ∆(Γ), Proposition 2.8
does not yield any benefit in this case over directly applying the Minimax Theorem to
Γ0. Rather, we have used Proposition 2.8 to illustrate our proof strategy for Theorems 3.9
and 4.7, in which we use stronger versions of Lemma 2.15 to choose Σ with conv(Σ) ( ∆(Γ).
Second, note that in this case we know that there is a maximin strategy of Γ0 in the good
set ∆Π(Γ): this is just the statement of Nash’s Theorem. However, we cannot conclude this
directly from the fact that ∆Π(Γ) is a good set because of the remark after Proposition 2.8.
2.3 Groups acting on games
In this section we recall the notion of a group acting on a game, as defined by Nash [12].
All groups will be finite throughout. In any group e will denote the identity element. The
subgroup generated by group elements g1, . . . , gn will be denoted 〈g1, . . . , gn〉. For n ∈ N we
will write Zn for the additive group of integers mod n and Sn for the symmetric group on n
letters. We will use cycle notation to express permutations. For example σ = (1 2 3)(4 5)(6)
is shorthand for
σ(1) = 2, σ(2) = 3, σ(3) = 1, σ(4) = 5, σ(5) = 4, and σ(6) = 6.
Definition 2.17. A left action of the group G on the set X is a map · : G×X → X
written with infix notation which satisfies the identity condition e·x = x and the associativity
condition g · (h · x) = (gh) · x. A right action of G on X is a map · : X × G → X such
that x · e = x and (x · g) · h = x · (gh).
We say that an action is linear if it extends to an action on an ambient vector space V
containing X and the map x 7→ x · g on V is linear for all g ∈ G. An x ∈ X is G-invariant
if x · g = x for all g ∈ G. The set of G-invariant elements is denoted XG.
Proposition 2.18. If G acts linearly on the convex set X then there is a map aveG : X → XG
given by aveG(x) =
1
|G|
∑
g∈G x · g. In particular if X is nonempty then XG is nonempty.
Proof. For any x ∈ X, aveG(x) is a convex combination of elements x · g ∈ X, hence
aveG(x) ∈ X. For any h ∈ G we have
aveG(x) · h =
[
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
x · g
]
· h = 1|G|
∑
g∈G
(x · g) · h = 1|G|
∑
g∈G
x · (gh)
=
1
|G|
∑
g∈G
x · g = aveG(x),
where we have used linearity, the definition of a group action, and bijectivity of g 7→ gh.
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A left action of G on X induces right actions on many function spaces defined on X.
For example RX is the space of functions X → R. For y ∈ RX we can define y · g ∈ RX by
(y ·g)(x) = y(g ·x). The condition that this is a right action of G on RX follows immediately
from the fact that we began with a left action of G on X. For finite X (the case of most
interest to us), the same argument shows that G acts on ∆(X) on the right.
Definition 2.19. We say that a group G acts on the game Γ if the following conditions
hold. The group G acts on the left on the set of players I and
⊔
iCi, making g · si ∈ Cg·i
for si ∈ Ci. Such actions automatically induce a left action of G on C =
∏
iCi defined by
(g · s)g·i = g · si. We require that the utilities be invariant under the induced action on the
right: ug·i · g = ui, i.e., ug·i(g · s) = ui(s) for all i ∈ I, s ∈ C, and g ∈ G. We say that G is a
symmetry group of Γ and call elements of G symmetries of Γ.
Note that an action of G on a game can be fully specified by its action on
⊔
iCi or on C.
One way to do this is to choose G to be a subgroup of the symmetric group on
⊔
iCi or C
satisfying the above properties.
Definition 2.20. The stabilizer subgroup of player i is Gi := {g ∈ G | g · i = i}, and
acts on Ci on the left. We say that the action of G is player trivial if Gi = G for all i, or
in other words if g · i = i for all g and i. We say that the action of G is player transitive
if for all i, j ∈ I there exists g ∈ G such that g · i = j.
We illustrate the notion of group actions on a game using four examples.
Example 2.21. Let Γ be any game and G any group. Define g ·s = s for all g ∈ G and s ∈ C.
This defines a player-trivial action of G on Γ called the trivial action.
Example 2.22. A two-player finite game is often called a bimatrix game because it can be
described by two matrices A and B, such that if player one plays strategy i and player two
plays strategy j then their payoffs are Aij and Bij, respectively. If these matrices are square
and B = AT then we call the game a symmetric bimatrix game. One example is the
game of chicken, which has A = [ 4 15 0 ] = B
T .
To put this in the context of group actions defined above, let each player’s strategy set
be C1 = C2 = {1, . . . ,m} indexing the rows and columns of A and B. Define g · (i, j) = (j, i)
for (i, j) ∈ C, so g · (g · (i, j)) = (i, j). The assumption B = AT is exactly the utility
compatibility condition saying that this specifies an action of G = {e, g} ∼= Z2 on this game.
Of course, depending on the structure of A and B there may be other nontrivial symmetries
as well. The element g swaps the players, so the action of G is player transitive.
Example 2.23. Note that the condition that a bimatrix game be symmetric is not that
A = AT and B = BT . Indeed, such a game need not have any nontrivial symmetries.
For example, consider the game defined by A = [ 0 22 1 ] and B = [
3 0
0 1 ]. The unique Nash
equilibrium of this game is for player 1 to play the mixed strategy p = [ 14
3
4 ] and player 2
to play q = [ 13
2
3 ]. Since the equilibrium is unique, any symmetry of the game must induce
a corresponding symmetry of the equilibrium by Nash’s Theorem. But the four entries of p
and q are all distinct, so the only symmetry of this game is the trivial one.
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(u1, u2) H2 T2
H1 (1,−1) (−1, 1)
T1 (−1, 1) (1,−1)
Table 1: Matching pennies. Player 1 chooses rows and player 2 chooses columns.
Example 2.24. Consider the game of matching pennies, whose utilities are shown in Table 1.
The labels H and T stand for heads and tails, respectively, and the subscripts indicate
the identities of the players for notational purposes. This a bimatrix game, but it is not a
symmetric bimatrix game in the sense of Example 2.22.
Nonetheless this game does have symmetries. The easiest to see is the map σ which
interchanges the roles of heads and tails. Letting g be the permutation of
⊔
iCi given in
cycle notation as g = (H1 T1)(H2 T2), we define g · si = g(si). Another symmetry is the
permutation h = (H1 H2 T1 T2). These satisfy g
2 = e and h2 = g, so G = 〈h〉 ∼= Z4. Note
that g acts on I as the identity whereas h swaps the players, so G acts player transitively,
whereas 〈g〉 ∼= Z2 acts player trivially.
Example 2.25. Now we consider an example of an n-player game with symmetries. Through-
out this example all arithmetic will be done mod n. For simplicity in this example we will
index the players using the members of Zn instead of the set {1, . . . , n}. Each player’s
strategy space will be Ci = Zn as well. Define
ui(s1, . . . , sn) =
{
1, when si = si−1 + 1
0, otherwise.
Then we can define a symmetry g by g(si) = si + 1, which increments each player’s
strategy by one mod n, but fixes the identities of the players. Clearly g is a permutation of
order n.
We can define another symmetry h which maps a strategy for player i to the same
numbered strategy for player i + 1. That is to say, h acts on C by cyclically permuting its
arguments. Again, h is a permutation of order n. Note that g and h commute, so together
they generate a symmetry group G ∼= Zn×Zn. Both 〈h〉 ∼= Zn and G act player transitively,
whereas 〈g〉 ∼= Zn acts player trivially. If n is composite and factors as n = kl for k, l > 1
then 〈hk〉 ∼= Zl acts on Γ but neither player transitively nor player trivially.
The left actions in the definition of a group action on a game induce linear right actions
on function spaces such as ∆(Γ) ( RC and ∆Π(Γ) ( RunionsqiCi . The inclusion map RunionsqiCi → RC
is G-equivariant (commutes with the action of G), so with regard to this action it does not
matter whether we choose to view ∆Π(Γ) as a subset of RunionsqiCi or of RC .
Because of the utility compatibility conditions of a group action on a game, the actions
on ∆(Γ) and ∆Π(Γ) restrict to actions on the sets CE(Γ) and NE(Γ), respectively. This
allows us to define the G-invariant subsets ∆G(Γ), ∆
Π
G(Γ), CEG(Γ), and NEG(Γ). The action
of the stabilizer subgroup Gi on Ci allows us to define the G-invariant subset ∆Gi(Ci).
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The main theorem we set out to prove is the following. This theorem is most often
applied in the case where G is the trivial group, but Nash proved the general case in [12]
and so shall we.
Nash’s Theorem. A game with symmetry group G has a G-invariant Nash equilibrium.
To prove this we will use Hart and Schmeidler’s techniques in a new way. We will show
that certain classes of symmetric games have correlated equilibria with a much higher degree
of symmetry than might be expected without knowledge of Nash’s Theorem. To illustrate
what we mean, consider the following trivial improvement on Theorem 2.16.
Proposition 2.26. A game with symmetry group G has a G-invariant correlated equilibrium.
Proof. Apply Proposition 2.18 to a correlated equilibrium, which exists by Theorem 2.16.
A priori we might not expect correlated equilibria with a greater degree of symmetry than
predicted by Proposition 2.26 to exist. But viewing G-invariant Nash equilibria as correlated
equilibria, we see that we can often guarantee much more. Suppose we have an n-player
game which has identical strategy sets for all players and which is symmetric under cyclic
permutations of the players, such as the game in Example 2.25. Then Proposition 2.26 yields
a correlated equilibrium pi which is invariant under cyclic permutations of the players, but
need not be invariant under other permutations. On the other hand the Nash equilibrium
ρ = (ρ1, . . . , ρn) given by Nash’s Theorem satisfies ρ1 = · · · = ρn so the corresponding
product distribution pi(s1, . . . , sn) = ρ1(s1) · · · ρ1(sn) is a correlated equilibrium which is
invariant under arbitrary permutations of the players.
3 Exchangeable equilibria
In this section we prove the existence of correlated equilibria with this higher degree of
symmetry, as well as a useful factorization property, without appealing to Nash’s Theorem.
3.1 Exchangeable distributions
First we need the notion of an exchangeable probability distribution. Our usage of the term
“exchangeable” is slightly nonstandard but is closely related to the usual notion in the case
when G acts player transitively.
Definition 3.1. Viewing ∆ΠG(Γ) as a nonconvex subset of the convex set ∆G(Γ), we define
the set of G-exchangeable probability distributions
∆XG (Γ) := conv ∆
Π
G(Γ) ⊆ ∆G(Γ).
We use the term “exchangeable” because of the important case where the Ci are all
equal and the group G acts player transitively (e.g. in Example 2.25). Then distributions
in ∆XG (Γ) are invariant under arbitrary permutations of the players. Furthermore, by De
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Finetti’s Theorem2 these are exactly the distributions which can be extended to exchangeable
distributions on infinitely many copies of C1, i.e., distributions invariant under permutations
of finitely many indices. De Finetti’s Theorem will not play a direct role in our analysis;
here it merely serves to motivate Definition 3.1.
To get a feel for these sets, we will look at them in the context of some examples.
Example 2.21 (cont’d). Since G acts trivially we can ignore it entirely. Not all distributions
are independent so ∆ΠG(Γ) ( ∆G(Γ) = ∆(Γ), but ∆XG (Γ) = ∆G(Γ). As we have seen, one
inclusion is automatic. To prove the reverse note that for any s ∈ C, δs = δs1 · · · δsn ∈
∆Π(Γ) = ∆ΠG(Γ). But for any pi ∈ ∆(Γ) we can write pi =
∑
s∈C pi(s)δs, and such a convex
combination of the δs is in ∆
X
G (Γ) by definition.
Example 2.22 (cont’d). For a symmetric bimatrix game Γ withm strategies per player, we can
view probability distributions over C as m×m nonnegative matrices with entries summing
to unity. The nontrivial symmetry g ∈ G acts by swapping the players. From the definitions
we see that ∆G(Γ) consists of symmetric matrices and ∆
Π
G(Γ) of matrices which are outer
products xxT for nonnegative column vectors x ∈ Rm. The elements of ∆XG (Γ) = conv ∆ΠG(Γ)
are exactly the (normalized) completely positive matrices studied in [1]. Clearly all such
matrices are symmetric, elementwise nonnegative, and positive semidefinite; it turns out the
converse holds if and only if m ≤ 4 [3].
Example 2.24 (cont’d). The map on C induced by h is the permutation
((H1, H2) (T1, H2) (T1, T2) (H1, T2)).
In particular, a G-invariant probability distribution must assign equal probability to all
four outcomes in C1 × C2. There is only one such distribution and it is independent, so
∆ΠG(Γ) = ∆
X
G (Γ) = ∆G(Γ).
Example 2.25 (cont’d). Recall that in this game there are n players and the Ci are the same
for all i. The group G permutes the players cyclically. Therefore the elements of ∆ΠG(Γ) are
invariant under arbitrary permutations of the players, hence so are the elements of ∆XG (Γ).
(The converse statement is false; that is to say, there are probability distributions over C
which are invariant under arbitrary permutations of the players but are not in ∆XG (Γ). This
is analogous to the presence in Example 2.22 of symmetric elementwise nonnegative matrices
which are not positive semidefinite, hence not completely positive.) On the other hand, an
element of ∆G(Γ) need only be invariant under cyclic permutations of the players.
We close the section on exchangeable distributions with a characterization of ∆XG (Γ) which
we will not need until Section 4.3 but which logically belongs here. The characterization is
a corollary of a more general convexity lemma which we state first.
Lemma 3.2. Let f : K → V be a continuous map from a compact set K to a finite-
dimensional real vector space V . Extending f by linearity yields a weakly continuous map
2De Finetti’s theorem states that the distribution of an infinite sequence of random variables X1, X2, . . .
is invariant under permutations of finitely many of the random variables (exchangeable) if and only if it is
a mixture of i.i.d. distributions [14].
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∆(K)→ V given by pi 7→ ∫ f dpi which we also call f . The image of this map is f(∆(K)) =
conv(f(K)).
Proof. The extension f is weakly continuous by definition. Clearly f(∆(K)) is convex and
contains f(K), so one containment is immediate. By linearity of integration, any linear
inequality valid on f(K) must be valid on f(∆(K)), so the reverse containment follows by a
separating hyperplane argument (see Theorem 3.1.1 of [9] for details or Theorem 2.8 of [17]
for an alternative topological argument).
Corollary 3.3. The linear extension of the inclusion map ∆ΠG(Γ) → ∆G(Γ) is weakly con-
tinuous and maps ∆(∆ΠG(Γ)) onto ∆
X
G (Γ).
3.2 Exchangeable equilibria
We are now ready to define exchangeable equilibria. The proofs of the propositions in this
section are direct algebraic manipulations and some are omitted.
Definition 3.4. The set of G-exchangeable equilibria of a game Γ is
XEG(Γ) := CE(Γ) ∩∆XG (Γ).
When G can be inferred from context we simply refer to exchangeable equilibria.
It is immediate from the definitions that conv(NEG(Γ)) ⊆ XEG(Γ) ⊆ CEG(Γ). There are
examples in which all of these inclusions are strict [16], so proving non-emptiness of XEG(Γ)
does not immediately prove non-emptiness of NEG(Γ). Nonetheless, this is an important
step and the main result of this section.
The proof that a G-exchangeable equilibrium exists proceeds along the same lines as the
correlated equilibrium existence proof in Section 2.2. We again consider the zero-sum game
Γ0 and prove that a certain set is good in this game (Lemma 3.8). The difference is that the
action of G yields a smaller good set, ∆ΠG(Γ). To prove this lemma we need the following
three symmetry results, which have straightforward proofs.
Proposition 3.5. If G acts on Γ then G acts player trivially on Γ0 by g · (s, (ri, ti)) =
(g · s, (g · ri, g · ti)).
Proposition 3.6. If G acts player trivially on a zero-sum game, then a set Σ ⊆ ∆G(CM)
is good if and only if it is good against ∆G(Cm).
Proof. For all g ∈ G, σ ∈ ∆G(CM), and θ ∈ ∆(Cm) we have uM(σ, θ · g) = uM(σ · g, θ · g) =
uM(σ, θ), so uM(σ, θ) = uM(σ, aveG(θ)).
Proposition 3.7. The map Mm(γ(·)) is natural in the sense that if σ : Ci → Cj is a
bijection and yi = yj ◦ (σ, σ), then composition with σ maps Mm(γ(yj)) to Mm(γ(yi)).
Lemma 3.8. If G acts on the game Γ then the set ∆ΠG(Γ) is good in the zero-sum game Γ
0
of Definition 2.12.
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Proof. By Proposition 3.5 and Proposition 3.6, it suffices to consider only y ∈ ∆G(C0m),
and show that there is a pi ∈ ∆ΠG(Γ) which is good against y. Lemma 2.15 states that any
pi ∈ S(y) := Mm(γ(y1))× · · · ×Mm(γ(yn)) ⊂ ∆Π(Γ) is good against y.
By Proposition 3.7 the action of G on ∆Π(Γ) restricts to a linear action of G on S(y)
since y ∈ ∆G(C0m). Viewing S(y) as a convex subset of RunionsqiCi , Proposition 2.18 shows the
G-invariant subset SG(y) ⊆ ∆ΠG(Γ) is nonempty, so ∆ΠG(Γ) is good.
Theorem 3.9. A game with symmetry group G has a G-exchangeable equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 2.16, Mm(Γ0) = CE(Γ). Lemma 3.8 shows we can apply Proposition 2.8
to Γ0 with Σ = ∆ΠG(Γ), proving that Mm(Γ
0) ∩∆XG (Γ) = XEG(Γ) is nonempty.
It is worth contrasting the proof that symmetric correlated equilibria exist (Proposi-
tion 2.26) with this proof. Both involve averaging arguments to produce symmetric solutions.
The difference is that in the proof of Proposition 2.26 the averaging occurs within the set
∆(Γ), whereas in the case of Theorem 3.9 (in particular Lemma 3.8), the averaging occurs
within ∆Π(Γ), viewed as a convex subset of RunionsqiCi . By averaging within this smaller set,
we guarantee that the resulting correlated equilibrium will have the additional symmetries
discussed at the end of Section 2.3.
The latter averaging argument requires a bit more care. In particular, Proposition 2.26
is an immediate corollary of Theorem 2.16 on the existence of correlated equilibria. On
the other hand, to prove Theorem 3.9 we have to “lift the hood” on Theorem 2.16 and use
Lemma 2.15 on good sets. By doing so we exhibit a correlated equilibrium which we can
prove lies in ∆XG (Γ) instead of just ∆G(Γ).
4 Higher order exchangeable equilibria
In this section we begin with a game Γ and artificially add symmetries to produce two families
of games ΠmΓ and ΞmΓ with larger symmetry groups for each m ∈ N. Having constructed
these games, we can exploit our knowledge of their structure to improve Theorem 3.9 and
show that there are distributions which are simultaneously exchangeable equilibria of both
ΠmΓ and ΞmΓ. We call such distributions order m exchangeable equilibria.
We then use a compactness argument to exhibit a distribution which is simultaneously an
order m exchangeable equilibrium for all m ∈ N, called an order∞ exchangeable equilibrium.
We will see in the next section that for player-transitive symmetry groups, an order ∞
exchangeable equilibrium is just a mixture of symmetric Nash equilibria.
Most of the work in this section consists of making the proper definitions. Once that is
done, the proofs are rather short.
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4.1 Powers of games
To define order m G-exchangeable equilibria we will need two notions of a power of a game Γ.
These are larger games in which multiple copies of Γ are played simultaneously3. Throughout
this section we will take as fixed a game Γ with symmetry group G and a number m ∈ N.
Definition 4.1. For m ∈ N, the mth power of Γ, denoted ΠmΓ, is a game in which m
independent copies of Γ are played simultaneously. More specifically, ΠmΓ has mn players
labeled by pairs i, j, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j ≤ m, strategy spaces ΠmCij := Ci for all i, j with
generic element sji , and utilities Π
muij(s
1
1, . . . , s
m
n ) := ui(s
j
1, s
j
2, . . . , s
j
n).
The contracted mth power of Γ, denoted ΞmΓ, is a game in which m copies of Γ
are played simultaneously, but all by the same set of players. Specifically, ΞmΓ has n play-
ers, strategy spaces ΞmCi := C
m
i with generic element (s
1
i , . . . , s
m
i ) for all i, and utilities
Ξmui(s
1
1, . . . , s
m
n ) :=
∑
j ui(s
j
1, s
j
2, . . . , s
j
n).
Γ ΠmΓ ΞmΓ
s2
s1
s12 s
2
2 · · · sm2
s11 s
2
1 · · · sm1
s12 s
2
2 · · · sm2
s11 s
2
1 · · · sm1
Figure 1: Representing a 2-player game Γ with players choosing strategies s1 and s2 as drawn
on the left, the powers ΠmΓ and ΞmΓ are formed as shown. A shaded box represents actions
controlled by a single player, whose utility is given by the sum over all interactions.
Proposition 4.2. Let Γ be a game with symmetry group G and fix m ∈ N. Then both powers
ΠmΓ and ΞmΓ are games with symmetry group G× Sm and they satisfy:
• ∆G×Sm (ΠmΓ) = ∆G×Sm (ΞmΓ)
• ∆ΠG×Sm (ΠmΓ) ( ∆ΠG×Sm (ΞmΓ)
• ∆XG×Sm (ΠmΓ) ⊆ ∆XG×Sm (ΞmΓ).
Proof. Both powers are invariant under arbitrary permutations of the copies and under
symmetries in G applied to all of the copies simultaneously. In fact in the case of ΠmΓ we
can apply a different symmetry in G to each copy independently so that ΠmΓ is invariant
3 These definitions can be generalized to define two possible products of games, so that the powers we
define reduce to m-fold products of a game with itself. If we remove all mention of symmetry groups (so in
particular exchangeable distributions and exchangeable equilibria are no longer defined) all the statements
we make about Nash and correlated equilibria of these powers extend to corresponding statements about
products with identical proofs. We will not need this level of generality, however, so to avoid complicating
notation we focus on powers.
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under the larger group G o Sm (the wreath product of G and Sm), but we will not need this
fact.
Since G×Sm acts on ΠmC and ΞmC in the same way, we get the first equality. The game
ΠmΓ has more players than ΞmΓ, so ∆ΠG×Sm (Π
mΓ) has stronger independence conditions
than ∆ΠG×Sm (Ξ
mΓ), yielding the strict containment. Taking convex hulls gives the final
containment.
Since ∆G×Sm(Π
mΓ) = ∆G×Sm(Ξ
mΓ), we can compare the conditions for a distribution
pi to be a correlated equilibrium of ΠmΓ or ΞmΓ. We use the notation and terminology
introduced for Proposition 2.5 to do so.
Proposition 4.3. Let (X11 , . . . , X
m
n ) be a random vector taking values in C
m distributed
according to pi ∈ ∆G×Sm (ΠmΓ) = ∆G×Sm (ΞmΓ). Then
• pi is a correlated equilibrium of ΠmΓ if and only if Xji is a best response (in Γ) to
P(Xj−i | Xji ) almost surely for all i and j, and
• pi is a correlated equilibrium of ΞmΓ if and only if Xji is a best response (in Γ) to
P(Xj−i | X1i , . . . , Xmi ) almost surely for all i and j.
Proof. By Proposition 2.5, pi is a correlated equilibrium of ΠmΓ if and only if Xji is a best
response in ΠmΓ to P(X1, . . . , Xj−1, Xj−i, Xj+1, . . . , Xm | Xji ) almost surely for all i and j.
But the utility of player ij in ΠmΓ is ui(X
j
1 , . . . , X
j
n), so player ij can ignore X
l
k for all l 6= j.
Now we consider when pi is a correlated equilibrium of ΞmΓ. Again by Proposition 2.5,
this happens if and only if (X1i , . . . , X
m
i ) is a best response in Ξ
mΓ to P(X1−i, . . . , Xm−i |
X1i , . . . , X
m
i ) almost surely for all i. The utility of player i in Ξ
mΓ is
∑
j ui(X
j
1 , X
j
2 , . . . , X
j
n)
and no Xji appears in more than one term of this sum. Thus the sum is maximized when
each term is maximized independently. That is to say pi ∈ CEG×Sm(ΞmΓ) if and only if Xji
is a best response in Γ to P(Xj−i | X1i , . . . , Xmi ) almost surely for all i and j.
This characterization allows us to prove the following containments between equilibrium
sets. One can construct examples showing that in general none of the inclusions in this
proposition can be reversed. In particular, no containment holds between XEG×Sm (Π
mΓ)
and XEG×Sm (Ξ
mΓ) in either direction. This is connected to the fact that the inclusion
between the sets of correlated equilibria of ΠmΓ and ΞmΓ goes in the opposite direction from
the inclusion between the sets of Nash equilibria.
Proposition 4.4. The equilibria of ΠmΓ and ΞmΓ satisfy
NEG×Sm (Π
mΓ) ⊆ NEG×Sm (ΞmΓ) ⊆ CEG×Sm (ΞmΓ) ⊆ CEG×Sm (ΠmΓ) .
Proof. We use Proposition 4.3. If Xji are distributed according to pi ∈ ∆ΠG×Sm(ΠmΓ) then the
Xji are all independent, so the conditional distributions in Proposition 4.3 are equal to the
corresponding unconditional distributions and both conditions are equivalent. This proves
the first containment.
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The second containment follows because Nash equilibria are always correlated equilibria.
For the third containment, suppose Xji is a best response to P(X
j
−i | X1i , . . . , Xmi ) almost
surely. Summing over possible values of X−ji we get that X
j
i is a best response to P(X
j
−i | Xji )
almost surely.
For any 1 ≤ p < m we can define a projection map proj : ∆G×Sm(ΠmΓ) → ∆G×Sp(ΠpΓ)
which marginalizes out variables Xp+1, . . . , Xm. This map respects the structure of all the
sets of distributions mentioned in Proposition 4.2, i.e., it restricts to maps ∆ΠG×Sm(Π
mΓ)→
∆ΠG×Sp(Π
pΓ), ∆XG×Sm(Ξ
mΓ)→ ∆XG×Sp(ΞpΓ), etc. By Proposition 4.3 it also respects the equi-
librium structure of these games in the sense that XEG×Sm(Π
mΓ) maps into XEG×Sp(Π
pΓ),
NEG×Sm(Ξ
mΓ) maps into NEG×Sp(Ξ
pΓ), etc.
One can show that if p = 1 then all of these maps are onto. We use this fact only to
motivate what follows and not in any of the arguments below, so we omit its proof. In
particular, this shows that proj(XEG×Sm(Π
mΓ)) = XEG(Γ) = proj(XEG×Sm(Ξ
mΓ)). One
can give an example in which conv(NEG(Γ)) ( XEG(Γ) [16], so neither of these projected
sets of exchangeable equilibria approaches the convex hull of the Nash equilibria of Γ as m
gets large. We will see that taking the intersection XEG×Sm (Π
mΓ) ∩ XEG×Sm (ΞmΓ) fixes
this problem.
4.2 Order m G-exchangeable equilibria
By Propositions 4.2 and 4.4 we have NEG×Sm(Π
mΓ) ⊆ XEG×Sm(ΠmΓ) ∩ XEG×Sm(ΞmΓ).
Thus we expect the following definition not to be vacuous.
Definition 4.5. The set of order m G-exchangeable equilibria of Γ is
XEmG (Γ) := XEG×Sm (Π
mΓ) ∩ XEG×Sm (ΞmΓ) ,
or equivalently by Propositions 4.2 and 4.4,
XEmG (Γ) := ∆
X
G×Sm (Π
mΓ) ∩ CEG×Sm (ΞmΓ) .
The relationship between XEmG (Γ) and the sets of equilibria of the m
th powers is summa-
rized in Figure 2. We now prove order m G-exchangeable equilibria exist.
Lemma 4.6. If G acts on the game Γ then the set ∆ΠG×Sm(Π
mΓ) is good in the zero-sum
game (ΞmΓ)0 of Definition 2.12.
Proof. By Lemma 3.8, Σ := ∆ΠG×Sm(Ξ
mΓ) is good. The utilities in ΞmΓ are additively
separable, so any mixed strategy σ ∈ Σ is payoff equivalent for the maximizer in (ΞmΓ)0 to
a mixed strategy σ′ ∈ Σ′ := ∆ΠG×Sm(ΠmΓ) given by the product of the marginals of σ. We
can apply Proposition 2.10 to Σ and Σ′.
Theorem 4.7. A game with symmetry group G has an order m G-exchangeable equilibrium
for all m ∈ N.
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NEG×Sm(Π
mΓ) NEG×Sm(Ξ
mΓ)
XEmG (Γ)
XEG×Sm(Π
mΓ) XEG×Sm(Ξ
mΓ)
CEG×Sm(Π
mΓ) CEG×Sm(Ξ
mΓ)
proj
NEG(Γ)
proj(XEmG (Γ))
XEG(Γ)
CEG(Γ)
Figure 2: At the left is a summary of the containments between equilibrium sets of the
powers ΠmΓ and ΞmΓ proven in Section 4.1. An arrow A ↪→ B indicates A ⊆ B. Under the
marginalization map proj : ∆G×Sm(Π
mΓ) → ∆G(Γ) each of these sets maps onto the set at
the same height on the right.
Proof. By Theorem 2.16, Mm((ΞmΓ)0) = CE(ΞmΓ). Lemma 4.6 shows we can apply Propo-
sition 2.8 to (ΞmΓ)0 with Σ = ∆ΠG×Sm(Π
mΓ), so Mm((ΞmΓ)0) ∩∆XG×Sm(ΠmΓ) = XEmG (Γ) is
nonempty.
For 1 ≤ p < m, the marginalization map sends XEG×Sm(ΠmΓ) into XEG×Sp(ΠpΓ) and
XEG×Sm(Ξ
mΓ) into XEG×Sp(Ξ
pΓ). Therefore it sends XEmG (Γ) into XE
p
G(Γ). Projecting the
order m exchangeable equilibria into ∆G(Γ) for all m ∈ N we obtain
NEG(Γ) ⊆ conv(NEG(Γ)) ⊆ · · · ⊆ proj(XE3G(Γ)) ⊆ proj(XE2G(Γ)) ⊆ XEG(Γ) ⊆ CEG(Γ).
This raises two natural questions: can we prove directly that
⋂∞
m=1 proj(XE
m
G (Γ)) is non-
empty? and does this intersection equal conv(NEG(Γ))? We will take up these two questions,
respectively, in the following two sections.
4.3 Order ∞ G-exchangeable equilibria
Next we use a compactness argument to prove existence of an order ∞ G-exchangeable
equilibrium, a distribution which is in some sense an order m G-exchangeable equilibrium
for all finite m. As we have defined them the XEmG (Γ) are distributions over different numbers
of copies of C, so they are not directly comparable and we can’t just take their intersection.
We could project them all into ∆G(Γ) and take the intersection there as mentioned above,
but this would destroy some structure. Analytically it will be more convenient to view these
sets within a larger space.
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To take the intersection properly, we will transport all the XEmG (Γ) into ∆(∆
Π
G(Γ)). Since
Sm acts transitively on the copies of the game in Π
mΓ, an element ρ ∈ ∆ΠG×Sm(ΠmΓ) satisfies
ρji = ρ
k
i for all i,j, and k. Therefore the diagonal map ∆
Π
G(Γ) → ∆ΠG×Sm(ΠmΓ) which sends
a distribution to the product of m independent copies of itself is a homeomorphism. This
extends to a homeomorphism ∆(∆ΠG(Γ))→ ∆(∆ΠG×Sm(ΠmΓ)) of the corresponding spaces of
distributions. If we compose this with the surjective map ∆(∆ΠG×Sm(Π
mΓ))→ ∆XG×Sm(ΠmΓ)
given by Corollary 3.3, we get a surjective map µm : ∆(∆G(Γ))→ ∆XG×Sm(ΠmΓ).
Define the inverse image sets Am = µ
−1
m (XE
m
G (Γ)). Elements of Am are representations
of order m G-exchangeable equilibria as mixtures of independent G-invariant distributions.
Definition 4.8. The set of order ∞ G-exchangeable equilibria is XE∞G (Γ) :=
⋂∞
m=1 Am.
Theorem 4.9. A game with symmetry group G has an order∞ G-exchangeable equilibrium.
Proof. Each set XEmG (Γ) is convex and closed by definition and nonempty by Theorem 4.7.
The map µm is linear, weakly continuous, has a compact Hausdorff domain, and is surjective.
Therefore each Am is convex, compact, and nonempty.
For 1 ≤ p < m, the composition µp ◦ µ−1m is a well-defined map ∆XG×Sm(ΠmΓ) →
∆XG×Sp(Π
pΓ) which coincides with the marginalization map discussed above. This map sends
XEmG (Γ) into XE
p
G(Γ) as per the discussion at the end of Section 4.2, so the Am are nested
A1 ⊇ A2 ⊇ A3 ⊇ . . .. Thus they have nonempty, convex, compact intersection XE∞G (Γ).
5 Nash’s Theorem
5.1 The player-transitive case
Theorem 5.1. If G acts player transitively on Γ, then XE∞G (Γ) = ∆(NEG(Γ)).
Proof. If σ ∈ NEG(Γ) then µm(δσ) ∈ NEG×Sm(ΠmΓ) ⊆ XEmG (Γ), so δσ ∈ Am for all m and
δσ ∈ XE∞G (Γ). But XE∞G (Γ) is convex and weakly closed, so ∆(NEG(Γ)) = conv{δσ | σ ∈
NEG(Γ)} ⊆ XE∞G (Γ).
For the converse let R be a random variable taking values in ∆ΠG(Γ) distributed according
to pi ∈ XE∞G (Γ). Let Xji , 1 ≤ i ≤ n, 1 ≤ j < ∞, be random variables taking values in Ci
with distribution Ri which are conditionally independent given R. We must show that Ri
is a best response to R−i almost surely. We will do this by approximating Ri and R−i in
terms of the Xji .
For each k ∈ N the finite collection of random variables Xji with j ≤ k is distributed
according to µk(pi) by construction; here we implicitly use the fact that µk(pi) is an order
∞ G-exchangeable equilibrium, so µk(pi) ∈ ∆XG×Sm(ΠmΓ). Furthermore we have µk(pi) ∈
CEG×Sk(Ξ
kΓ), so Proposition 4.3 states that for any 1 ≤ j ≤ k the strategy Xji is a best
response to the random conditional distribution P(Xj−i | X1i , . . . , Xki ) almost surely.
Since µk(pi) is symmetric, P(Xj−i | X1i , . . . , Xki ) ≡ P(X1−i | X1i , . . . , Xki ) for all i, j, and
k. We define Pki to be this common random conditional distribution. Let Yji be the random
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variable taking values in ∆(Ci) which is the empirical distribution of X
1
i , . . . , X
j
i . Then Yji
is a best response to Pki whenever j ≤ k. We will show that Yji and Pki converge to Ri and
R−i, respectively, as j and k go to infinity.
Let Σi be the completion of the σ-algebra generated by X
1
i , X
2
i , . . . and define P∞i :=
P(X1−i | Σi). Then Pki → P∞i almost surely as k goes to infinity (Theorem 10.5.1 in [4]).
Therefore Yji is a best response to P∞i for all j. By the strong law of large numbers,
Yji converges almost surely to Ri as j goes to infinity, so Ri is a best response to P∞i .
Furthermore, Ri is measurable with respect to Σi because the Yji are.
The Xji are conditionally independent given R, so we have P∞i = E(P(X1−i | R) | Σi).
Since G acts player transitively, for any player j we have Rj = Ri · g for some g ∈ G, hence
Rj is measurable with respect to Σi and so is R. In particular P(X1−i | R) is measurable
with respect to Σi and we obtain
P∞i = E(P(X1−i | R) | Σi) = P(X1−i | R) = R−i.
This shows that Ri is a best response to R−i almost surely for all i, so R ∈ NEG(Γ) almost
surely and pi ∈ ∆(NEG(Γ)).
If G is the trivial group one can show that µ1(XE
∞
G (Γ)) = CE(Γ) and µ1(∆(NEG(Γ))) =
conv(NE(Γ)). These sets are different for some games (e.g., chicken), so the above theorem
can fail without the player-transitivity assumption.
Nash’s Theorem (player-transitive case). A game with player-transitive symmetry group
G has a G-invariant Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Combine Theorems 4.9 and 5.1, noting that ∆(∅) = ∅.
5.2 Arbitrary symmetry groups
In this section we show how to embed an arbitrary game Γ with symmetry group G in a
game ΓSym with a player-transitive symmetry group, preserving the existence of G-invariant
Nash equilibria. This allows us to drop the player-transitivity assumption from the previous
section, proving Nash’s Theorem in full generality.
There are a variety of ways to symmetrize games. The one we have chosen is a natural
n-player generalization of von Neumann’s tensor-sum symmetrization discussed in [6]. The
idea is that each of the n players in ΓSym plays all the roles of the players in Γ simultaneously.
The players in ΓSym play n! copies of Γ, one for each assignment of players in ΓSym to roles
in Γ. A player’s utility in ΓSym is the sum of his utilities over the copies.
Definition 5.2. Given an n-player game Γ with strategy sets Ci and utilities ui we define its
symmetrization ΓSym to be the n-player game with strategy sets CSymi := C (with typical
strategy si = (si1, . . . , s
i
n)) and utilities
uSymi (s) :=
∑
τ∈Sn
uτ(i) (d(τ ? s)) ,
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where s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ CSym = Cn, ? : Sn × CSym → CSym is defined by (τ ? s)k := sτ−1(k),
and d : CSym → C is defined by [d(s)]k := skk.
We now show that ΓSym is a game with player-transitive symmetry group. We will use ?
to denote the action on ΓSym to distinguish it from the action · on Γ.
Proposition 5.3. If Γ is a game with symmetry group G then ΓSym is a game with player-
transitive symmetry group G× Sn, where σ ∈ Sn acts by ? as defined above and g ∈ G acts
by
g ? (s1, . . . , sn) 7→ (g · s1, . . . , g · sn).
Proof. Note that ? defines an action of G on CSym. Also, for σ, τ ∈ Sn we have
(τ ? (σ ? s))k = (σ ? s)τ
−1(k) = sσ
−1(τ−1(k)) = s(τσ)
−1(k) = ((τσ) ? s)k,
so ? is an action of Sn on C
Sym as well. These actions commute, so together they define
an action ? of G × Sn on CSym. Note that the induced actions on players are g ? i = i and
σ ? i = σ(i).
To show that this is an action of G× Sn on ΓSym it suffices to show that the utilities of
ΓSym are invariant under the action of any σ ∈ Sn and any g ∈ G. To see the former, let
σ ∈ Sn. Then we have
uSymσ?i (σ ? s) =
∑
τ∈Sn
uτ(σ(i)) (d(τ ? (σ ? s))) =
∑
τ∈Sn
u(τσ)(i) (d((τσ) ? s) =
∑
τ∈Sn
uτ(i) (d(τ ? s))
= uSymi (s),
where we have used in the penultimate equation the fact that Sn is a group, so the map
τ 7→ τσ is a bijection. To see the latter, let g ∈ G and let γ ∈ Sn be the permutation induced
by g on the set of players in Γ. Then we have d(g ? s) = g · d(γ−1 ? s), so
uSymg?i (g ? s) =
∑
τ∈Sn
uτ(i) (d(τ ? (g ? s))) =
∑
τ∈Sn
uτ(i) (d(g ? (τ ? s)))
=
∑
τ∈Sn
uτ(i)
(
g · d(γ−1 ? (τ ? s))) = ∑
τ∈Sn
u(γ−1τ)(i)
(
d((γ−1τ) ? s)
)
=
∑
τ∈Sn
uτ(i) (d(τ ? s)) = u
Sym
i (s),
where the fourth equation follows because g is a symmetry of Γ. Clearly Sn acts transitively
on the set of players.
Nash’s Theorem. A game with symmetry group G has a G-invariant Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let Γ be a game with symmetry group G. Then ΓSym is a game with player-transitive
symmetry group G×Sn by Proposition 5.3, so it has a (G×Sn)-symmetric Nash equilibrium
by the player-transitive version of Nash’s Theorem. By definition of the action of G × Sn
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on ΓSym, this Nash equilibrium is of the form (ρ, . . . , ρ), with ρ ∈ ∆G(Γ). Notice that
for each player i, each utility uSymk (s
1, . . . , sn) is a sum of functions which only depend
on sij for a single value of j. Thus ρ is payoff equivalent to the product of its marginals
ρ1 × · · · × ρn ∈ ∆ΠG(Γ). Therefore we can take the Nash equilibrium (ρ, . . . , ρ) to be such
that ρ ∈ ∆ΠG(Γ) by Proposition 2.11.
It remains to verify that ρ ∈ NEG(Γ). For any si ∈ C we can compute
uSymi (ρ, . . . , ρ, s
i, ρ, . . . , ρ) =
∑
τ∈Sn
uτ(i)
(
ρ1, . . . , ρτ(i)−1, siτ(i), ρτ(i)+1, . . . , ρn
)
= (n− 1)!
n∑
j=1
uj(ρ1, . . . , ρj−1, sij, ρj+1, . . . , ρn).
For each value of j we can vary the sij component of s
i independently and it is a best response
for player i to play ρ in ΓSym if the rest of the players play ρ, so we must have
uj(ρ1, . . . , ρj−1, sj, ρj+1, . . . , ρn) ≤ uj(ρ)
for all players j and all sj ∈ Cj, i.e., ρ ∈ NEG(Γ).
6 Conclusion
We have shown that by studying group actions on games and introducing the notion of
exchangeable equilibrium, we can prove Nash’s Theorem. To the authors’ knowledge, this
is the first proof of this theorem which uses convexity-based methods (i.e., the minimax
theorem). Previous proofs use path-following arguments or fixed-point theorems, which are
essentially equivalent to path-following arguments by Sperner’s Lemma.
This new proof invites new approaches for computing or approximating Nash equilibria.
One can rewrite the existence proof above for (order m) exchangeable equilibria in terms
of linear programs and separation arguments instead of the Minimax Theorem and apply
the ellipsoid algorithm, just as Papadimitriou has done for Hart and Schmeidler’s proof of
the existence of correlated equilibria [13]. This shows that exchangeable equilibria can be
computed in polynomial time, at least under some assumptions on the parameters. For
example, order m exchangeable equilibria of symmetric bimatrix games can be computed in
polynomial time for fixed m.
We have seen that in the player-transitive case order m exchangeable equilibria converge
to convex combinations of Nash equilibria as m goes to infinity. There are a variety of
ways one could imagine “rounding” exchangeable equilibria to try to produce approximate
Nash equilibria. We leave the analysis of such procedures, along with the question of which
assumptions on G allow computation of exchangeable equilibria in polynomial time, for
future work.
The power of these methods suggests that exchangeable equilibria should not merely
be viewed as a step on the way to Nash equilibria. Rather, they deserve further study
in their own right. We consider several interpretations of exchangeable equilibria and the
applications they suggest in [16].
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